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Over the past year, the courts of Louisiana have commented upon a variety
of subjects, including contractual negligence,' quasi contracts,2 stipulations pour
autrui,3 reformation of documents,4 offer and acceptance,' dation en paiement,6
damages,7 intentional interference with contracts,8 noncompetition pacts,9
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1. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Railroad Land Inc., 988 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1993).
2. See, e.g., Burns v. Sabine River Auth., 614 So. 2d 1337 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
617 So. 2d 935 (La. 1993).
3. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Traillour Oil Co., 987 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1993); Charia
v. Hulse, 619 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) ("[Decedent's intended legatees were third
party beneficiaries and thus could pursue a claim against the notary for his failure to perform the
contract he had with decedent to confect a valid will.") (citing Killingsworth v. Schlater, 292 So. 2d
536 (La. 1973)); Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 614 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 625
So. 2d 1007 (1993); McKee v. Southfield Sch., 613 So. 2d 659, 662 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) ("As
a third party beneficiary, [plaintiff's] rights under the contract are subject to the terms and conditions
of the contract entered into by [the contracting parties].") (citing Pelican Well & Tool Supply Co.
v. Johnson, 194 La. 987, 195 So. 514 (1940)); A. F. Blair Co. v. Haydel, 504 So. 2d 1044 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1987)).
4. See, e.g., Illinois Cent., 988 F.2d at 1405-06; Greer v. State, 616 So. 2d 811, 815 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1993) ("[Elither party to a contract is permitted to correct any error in an instrument
purporting to evidence the contract ..., provided that the rights of third parties have not intervened.")
(citing Succession of Jones v. Jones, 486 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d 249
(1986)); Wise v. Lapworth, 614 So. 2d 728, 731 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993) ("A contract may be
modified only by mutual consent.") (citing River Oaks, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Louisiana/Louisiana
Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 595 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 598 So. 2d 361 (1992)).
5. See, e.g., Myers v. Burger King Corp., 618 So. 2d 1123, 1126 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 629 So. 2d 348 (1993) ("[An offeree may tacitly accept a written offer.") (citing
Schlingkamp v. Aicklen, 534 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)).
6. See, e.g., Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Continental Marble & Granite Co., 615 So. 2d 1109, 1111
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1993) ("[A] dation, like a sale of movable property, is effective between the parties
from the moment of delivery, which accompanies the execution of the public act.") (citing Quality
Fin. Co. of Donaldson, Inc. v. Bourque, 315 So. 2d 656 (La. 1975)).
7. See, e.g., Mayerhofer v. Three R's Inc., 597 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 600
So. 2d 680 (1992).
8. See, e.g., WKG-TV Video Elec. College, Inc. v. Reynolds, 618 So. 2d 1023 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1993); Belle Pass Terminal, Inc. v. John, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1076 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
626 So. 2d 1172 (1993); Yarbrough v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 616 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1993); First Downtown Dev. Partnership v. Cimochowski, 613 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 615 So. 2d 340 (1993); Bolanos v. Madary, 609 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ
denied, 615 So. 2d 339 (1993). See also Bruce V. Schewe, Obligations, Developments in the Law,
1989-1990, 51 La. L. Rev. 361, 368-69 (1990).
9. See, e.g., Water Processing Technologies, Inc. v. Ridgeway, 618 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1993); Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Hogue, 618 So. 2d 1048 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
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error,'0  subrogation," proof of agreements, 2  duress, 3  specific
performance, 4  fraud, 5  warranties, 6  privity,' 7  rescission, 8  and
interpretation of contracts.' 9 The following discussion highlights a few of the
more noteworthy or unusual decisions.
A. Inexcusable Error-When Mea Culpa Does Not Suffice
The courts of Louisiana, building upon the French doctrine of "inexcusable
error '20 or contractual negligence, have long proclaimed that they will rescind
626 So. 2d 1171 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Hibernia, 615 So. 2d 1109.
11. See, e.g., Monk v. Scott Truck & Tractor, 619 So. 2d 890, 892 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993)
("Through subrogation, [the subrogee] can have no greater rights against [the defendant] than does
[the subrogor].") (citing Green v. Pesson Plumbing & Heating Co., 599 So. 2d 492, 493 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1992)).
12. See, e.g., Blue/Grey Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Inland Bay Drilling & Workover, Inc., 614 So.
2d 285 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 618 So. 2d 404 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Autin v. Autin, 617 So. 2d 229, 233 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d
846 (1993) ("Consent is vitiated when it has been obtained by duress of such a nature as to cause
a reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury to a party's person, property, or reputation.")
(citing La. Civ. Code art. 1959); Cagle v. Loyd, 617 So. 2d 592, 598 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
620 So. 2d 877 (1993).
14. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johnson, 602 So. 2d 272, 274 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992) ("A major
requirement of one who seeks specific performance is proper performance of his parn of the contract.
In the absence of proper performance, plaintiffs must prove they are and were ready to comply with
whatever obligations devolved upon them to perform.") (citing Carmadelle v. Koch-Ellis Marine
Contractors, 420 So. 2d 1029, 1031-32 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 869 (1983)).
15. See, e.g., Autin, 617 So. 2d at 232 ("The two elements essential to establishing legal fraud
are an intent to defraud or gain an unfair advantage and a resulting loss or damage.") (citing Heyl
v. Heyl, 445 So. 2d 88, 90 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 446 So. 2d 1228 (1984)).
16. See, e.g., Savannah v. Anthony's Auto Sales, Inc., 618 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 626 So. 2d 1174 (1993); Roddy v. Crawford, 618 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993);
Matthis v. Couvillion, 613 So. 2d 1024 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Coutee v. Williams, 611 So. 2d 803
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
17. See, e.g., Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership v. Doster Constr. Co., 602 So. 2d 1029 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1992), judgment set aside, 623 So. 2d 645 (1993).
18. See, e.g., Little v. First Nat'l Bank, 616 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993) ("The fact that
[borrower] could not afford to repay the loan, even if this fact is known by the lender, is not grounds
for rescission of the loan contract.").
19. See, e.g., Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992); Pat O'Brien's Bar, Inc. v.
Franco's Cocktail Prods., Inc., 615 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 909
(1993); Miguez & Leckband v. Holston's Ambulance Serv., Inc., 614 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1993); Moity v. New Iberia Bank, 612 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); Armstrong v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 614 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 908 (1993); Spell v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 618 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 624 So. 2d 1224 (1993); McCrory v.
Terminex Serv. Co., 609 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
20. Vernon V. Palmer, Contractual Negligence in the Civil Law-The Evolution of a Defense
to Actions for Error, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1975); Saul Litvinoff, "Error" in Civil Low, in Essays
on the Civil Law of Obligations 222, 225 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1969) (citing J. Ghestin., La notion
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a contract upon the basis of unilateral error only when the error is not the fault
of the party seeking rescission.2 In the seminal case of Watson v. Planters'
Bank, the court refused to avoid a contract when the party in error had failed to
read the writing evidencing the agreement before signing it." Subsequent cases
have expanded the doctrine to impose a general duty of due diligence upon
contracting parties2 3 in an effort to protect the party not in error. As one court
said, "[W]here one of two innocent parties must suffer, the one who caused the
error must suffer the consequences."24
In Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Railroad Land, Inc.,25 the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to invoke the doctrine of contractual
negligence in a reformation action premised upon mutual error. The court
correctly noted that no precedent existed for it to apply the theory of contractual
negligence in this context. Indeed, there is very little common ground shared
between the two actions.
Civil-law systems generally provide relief for unilateral error; these systems
have addressed the concurrence of unilateral error and negligence. The French
doctrine of inexcusable error is one resolution of this problem.26
On the other hand, the action for reformation of written contracts, an
equitable remedy that Louisiana received from the common law, corrects
mistakes or errors in a writing when the writing does not express the true
agreement between the parties.27 But, in the situation of mutual error the sole
negligence of one party is not at issue. 8
d'erreur dans le droit positif actuel (1963)).
21. See, e.g., Watson v. Planters' Bank, 22 La. Ann. 14 (1870); Moreland v. Smith, 457 So.
2d 748, 750-51 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 196 (1984); Hebert v. Livingston Parish
Sch. Bd., 438 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Wikoff v. Townsend, 7 Mart. (o.s.) 451 (La.
1820).
22. Watson, 22 La. Ann. at 14.
23. See Palmer, supra note 20, at 14-17. "[T]he defense of negligence may be premised upon
the breach of an implied precontractual duty owed by the rescinding party to his adversary
... requiring him to make a reasonable investigation before binding himself in a consensual
obligation. It may also be discussed in terms of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo." Id. at 14.
The doctrine of culpa in contrahendo provides that "damages should be recoverable against the party
whose blameworthy conduct during negotiations for a contract brought about its invalidity or.
prevented its perfection." Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good
Faith and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1964), quoted in
Palmer, supra note 20, at 42.
24. Cox-Hardie Co. v. Rabalais, 162 So. 2d 713, 715 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
25. 988 F.2d 1397, 1405-06 (5th Cir. 1993).
26. See, e.g., Dig. 41.10.5 (Neratius, Parchments 5); Dig. 18.143.1; BGB § 122 (Palanet 1974);
OR (C.O.) art. 28 (1911).
27. Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 583, 35 So. 2d 219, 224 (1948); Louisiana Sulfur Mining
Co. v. Brimstone R. & Canal Co., 143 La. 743, 746, 79 So. 324, 325-26 (1918).
28. See Elysian Homes Inc. v. Davis, 231 La. 95, 90 So. 2d 791 (1957). Moreover, modem
commentators have suggested that even in the context of unilateral error, concerns like reliance
damages on the part of an "innocent party" are better addressed by article 1952 of the Civil Code,
authorizing the court to award damages rather than enforce the defective agreement. La. Civ. Code
1994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Accordingly, the court in Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Railroad Land,
Inc. was correct in refusing to reform the terms of the defective written contract
by invoking the doctrine of contractual error.
B. On Handling Thy Neighbor's Problems
Aside from conventions, obligations may exist between individuals via
delicts29 and quasi contracts,30 including unjust enrichments. The Civil Code
places quasi contracts in two categories: the transaction of another's business and
the payment of a thing not due.3 In Burns v. Sabine River Authority,32 the
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit addressed the type of quasi
contract traditionally known as negotiorum gestio" or gestion d'affaire
d'altui.
3 4
Article 2295 of the Civil Code provides the following:
When a man undertakes, of his own accord, to manage the affairs of
another, where the owner be acquainted with the undertaking or
ignorant of it, the person assuming the agency contracts the tacit
engagement to continue it and to complete it, until the owner shall be
in a condition to attend to it himself ....
Article 2299 of the Civil Code sets forth reciprocal obligations on the part of the
owner: "Equity obliges the owner, whose business has been well managed, to
comply with the engagements contracted by the manager, in his name; to
indemnify the manager in all the personal engagements he has contracted; and
to reimburse him all useful and necessary expenses. 36 Commentators have
suggested that negotiorum gestio truly encompasses two notions-the obligation
of the gestor towards the owner arising from the gestor's intervention, and the
obligation of the owner, not unrelated to the theory of unjust enrichment, to
account to the gestor for his benefit."
art. 1952, cmt. b; see David P. Doughty, Comment, Error Revisited: The Louisiana Revision of
Error as a Vice of Consent in Contracting, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 717, 738 (1988). The approach of the
courts of Louisiana to negligence in contracting, by smudging the lines between delict and error, may
make rescission difficult to obtain. An analogy to bilateral error is comparative fault, where current
legal thought has rejected the "all or nothing" notion of contributory negligence.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1757. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2315 ("Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.").
30. La. Civ. Code art. 1757. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2293.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 2294.
32. 614 So. 2d 1337 (La. App. 3d Cir.). writ denied, 617 So. 2d 935 (1993).
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2295; see also Dig. 3.5.2 (Gaius, Provincial Edict 3).
34. See C. Civ. arts. 1372-75.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 2295.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2299.
37. See, e.g., J. Menalco Solis R., Comment, Management of the Affairs of Another, 36 Tul.
L. Rev. 108, 112 (1961).
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In Burns, the Sabine River Authority instituted and prevailed in a lawsuit to
remove a roadway across an inlet waterway that cut off water access to other
property. That, in the words of the court, presented "a classic case of negotio-
rum gestio. "38 In bringing the claim, the Sabine River Authority acted to
preserve the rights of the landowners of property that was cut off by the
roadway. Accordingly, seventeen years after the Sabine River Authority won the
judgment ordering the removal of the roadway, it was "obliged to complete the
management of that affair by enforcing the judgment it obtained as the gestor of
the owners."
39
The elements for the enforcement of the rights of the owner are not, in
Louisiana, as demanding as those for enforcement by the gestor of the correlative
obligations of the owner/°4 Thus, the contemporary view requires only that the
owner show an intervention into his juridic sphere before asserting his rights via
the quasi contract of negotiorum gestio.41 Any obligations owed by the owner,
however, may be enforced by the gestor only by showing that he intended to
manage the affairs of the owner and that the owner reaped a benefit from the
gestor's action.42
In Burns, the court's conclusions seem valid. An action based on
negotiorum gestio may have as its object the preservation of rights like those at
issue, which involved the accessibility of property by public waterway.43
Whether or not the property owners were aware of the benefit they received is
not relevant under the terms of Article 2295;" and the lack of any express
authorization or engagement among the affected landowners and the Sabine River
Authority confirms that the proper remedy lies in quasi contract.
38. Burns v. Sabine River Authority, 614 So. 2d 1337, 1340 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
617 So. 2d 935 (1993).
39. Id. The courts were forced to rely upon the quasi contract of negotiorum gestio after
concluding that the Sabine River Authority was not otherwise mandated by law to enforce the
judgment.
40. This distinction may be evidenced by the origins of negotiorum gestio, which can be traced
to the absolute authority of an owner at Roman Law and the corresponding rights vested in an owner
concerning another's intervention. See Solis, supra note 37, at I 11; Alfredo de Castro, Jr., Comment,
Negotiorum Gestio in Louisiana, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 253, 255 (1933).
41. See, e.g., Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435, 439
n. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). See also Chance v. Stevens of Leesville, Inc., 491 So. 2d 116 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 495 So. 2d 302 (1986); Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins.
Co., 411 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), order amended, 433 So. 2d 125 (1983). The gestor
may not act unlawfully. See La. Civ. Code art. 2293.
42. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Young, 456 So. 2d 622 (La. 1984); John P. Dawson, Negotiorum
Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 817, 824 (1961).
43. See 2 Marcel Plainol, Treatise on the Civil Law § 2274 (Louisiana Law Institute trans.,
1959). See also David v. Southern Import Wine Co., 171 So. 180 (La. App. Orl. 1936).
44. Article 2295 of the Civil Code provides that a negotiorum may exist whether the owner is
acquainted with the undertaking or ignorant of it.
19941
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C. Real Obligations, Subrogation, and Where They Are Not
In Aizpurua v. Crane Pool Co.," the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that
privity of contract was not required in a warranty action between a purchaser of
an immovable and a contractor who made improvements to the movable as a
consequence of an agreement with the vendor of the immovable.46 Although
somewhat abstruse, the opinion appeared to rest this conclusion upon three
alternative grounds.47 The first basis for the court's decision, premised upon
Article 2011 of the Civil Code of 1870, was the doctrine of "real obligations."48
The second ground was the court's invocation of Media Production Consultants,
Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.,49 where the court ruled that a
sub-buyer was subrogated to the original purchaser's!distributor's rights and
warranty action against the original vendor/manufacturer.5 0 Finally, the court
acknowledged the French doctrine of transmission, whereby the right to sue for
a breach of warranty is transmitted with the object of the sale as an accessory.
5 1
In St. Jude Medical Office Building Ltd. Partnership v. City Glass & Mirror
Inc.,52 the supreme court chipped away at Aizpurua. Travelers Insurance
Company ("Travelers"), the secured lender of St. Jude Medical Office Building,
Ltd. Partnership ("St. Jude Partnership"), acquired the mortgaged property via a
judicial sale. Travelers then sought to intervene in a suit commenced by St. Jude
Partnership against a contractor and several sub-contractors concerning alleged
faulty construction on a building forming a portion of the property that served
as the security under Travelers' mortgage. The trial court, affirmed on appeal
by the fifth circuit,5 3 dismissed Travelers' petition. The supreme court agreed.
5 4
45. 449 So. 2d 471 (La. 1984).
46. Bruce V. Schewe, Obligations, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984, 45 La. L. Rev. 447,
455-60 (1984).
47. See Jeffrey W. Weiss, Note, Overcoming Barriers of Privity to Warranty Actions-The
Introduction of the French Transmission Rule into the Louisiana Jurisprudence, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1128
(1985). See also Schewe, supra note 46, at 456-57.
48. Aizpurua, 449 So. 2d at 473. Comment b to Article 1763 says the following:
The classification of obligations as strictly personal, heritable, or real confuses the
traditional notion of an obligation, which is a vinculum juris between two persons, with
a real right, which is a right in a thing that can be held against the world .... Neither the
French Civil Code nor any other modem Civil Code has established this classification.
In this respect, the Louisiana Civil Code is entirely isolated in the civilian world.
See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real Obligations, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations 292, 296
(Joseph Dainow ed., 1969).
49. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
50. Aizpurua, 449 So. 2d at 472-73.
51. Id. at 473 ("[Tihe right to sue for breach of warranty of quality is transmitted with the
object of the sale.") (quoting Note, Sales-Warranty of Quality-Liability of Manufacturer to Sub-
Vendee for Breach of Warranty, 14 Tul. L. Rev. 470, 471 (1940)).
52. 619 So. 2d 529 (La. 1993).
53. 608 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 619 So. 2d 529 (1993).
54. St. Jude, 619 So. 2d at 51.
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The court began its analysis by noting that, as a general proposition, a
purchaser has no right against a third party who may have damaged the
purchased property before its sale to the present owner.55 The court then
rejected Travelers' assertion that Aizpurua authorizes an exception to that
principle.56 Deciding that "Aizpurua was based on the now repealed provisions
of LSA-C.C. art. 2011," the court concluded that at least this portion of the
case-that an action for defective construction of a building is a real obligation
running with the land to subsequent purchasers-is no longer valid under Article
1764, which replaced Article 2011 of the Civil Code of 1870.57 The court's
reading of Article 1764, revised in 1984, appears to be correct.58
Article 2011 of the Civil Code of 1870 afforded the acquirer of an
immovable, whether by universal or particular title, the right "to enforce a
contract made for the improvement of the property by a person from whom he
acquired it."59 Application of the legislation, however, was problematic: "The
duties [and rights] arising from a contract for the improvement of an immovable
may not be regarded as real obligations under the Code" because "while one
cannot transfer a greater real right than one has, one can always transfer things
free of all personal obligations contracted by an ancestor in title"; thus, "[i]n the
absence of assignment, personal obligations assumed by an ancestor in title may
not bind [or benefit] a particular successor, i.e., a purchaser ... under particular
title; this person is always a third person and may be bound [and benefited] only
by his own act. ' 60
Article 1763 now states that "[a] real obligation is a duty correlative and
incidental to a real right" burdening a thing.6' When viewed from this perspec-
tive, old Article 2011 may be understood as a mechanism for an ex lege
assignment of rights concerning contracts providing for the improvement of
immovables.62 As noted by the supreme court, however, comment (d) to
Article 1764 states that old Article 2011 has been "suppressed because its
provisions are conceptually inconsistent with other provisions of Louisiana
law.'
Although the court's decision in St. Jude appears to be correct, it illuminates
a troubling gap in Louisiana's creditor-debtor legal regime. By stripping
creditors (Travelers in this case) of any remedy against their mortgagors'
contractors, the court allows a contractor, who allegedly breached obligations and
55. Id. at 530.
56. Id. at 531.
57. Id. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1763, 1764 and 1764, cmt. (d). See also Schewe, supra note
46, at 485-89.
58. See Schewe, supra note 46, at 458-59.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 2011 (1870). See Yiannopoulos, supra note 48, at 298.
60. Yiannopoulos, supra note 48, at 298-306.
61. La. Civ. Code art. 1763 and cmt. (b).
62. Yiannopoulos, supra note 48, at 298-99.
63. St. Jude Medical Office Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v. City Glass & Mirror, Inc., 619 So. 2d
529, 531 (La. 1993) (citing La. Civ. Code art. 1764, cmt. (d)).
1994]
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warranties it owed to the former owner/mortgagor, to avoid any accountability
to the secured creditor/subsequent owner simply because the mortgagor defaulted
upon his agreement with the mortgagee and the secured creditor successfully bid
for the property at a judicial sale.' Moreover, as a matter of practicality, the
mortgagor who funded the improvements must absorb the loss in value to the
property allegedly attributable to the faulty workmanship without any recourse
against the contractor in question.65 The issue, in part,' calls for legislative
attention. An appropriate remedy may be legislation recognizing an ex lege
assignment of rights to a mortgaged creditor that acquires the secured property
at a judicial sale or providing a specific instance of subrogation under Article
1829(5).67
D. Dation en Paiement-Give It Away (and Register) Now
When Hibernia National Bank ("Hibernia") delayed for forty-eight hours
filing for recordation an instrument evidencing a partial dation en paiement from
Continental Marble & Granite ("Continental Marble"), it learned a hard lesson
about the stony resilience of Louisiana's public records doctrine. 6' During the
delay, a judgment creditor of Continental Marble filed its judgment for
recordation in the parish that was the situs of the transferred property. 69
Hibernia, not desiring encumbered property, attempted to avoid the dation en
paiement by raising various objections to its validity, focusing on error and
failure of cause.
Hibernia initially argued that the act had no effect until recordation, at which
point the immovable was not "free from any lien, mortgage, or encumbrance
whatsoever," as stipulated in the writing evidencing the dation en paiement.
70
Accordingly, Hibernia asked the court to avoid the agreement on the ground of
error. The court, however, correctly noted that a dation en paiement is effective
as between the parties from the moment of the execution of their contract.
Recordation, without language to the contrary in the agreement, is an issue only
64. If the rights against the contractor remain vested in and enforceable by the dispossessed
debtor, the rights would be a windfall to the mortgagor. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 2301; Minyard v.
Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967).
65. The purchaser of property at a judicial sale enjoys no warranty rights. La. Civ. Code arts.
2537, 2619.
66. Neither Aizpurua nor St. Jude mention rights flowing from conventional subrogation. See
Schewe, supra note 46, at 457. There appears to be no reason why the mortgage could not provide
for the subrogation of the mortgagee to the mortgagor's rights, particularly regarding the mortgagor's
claims against contractors making improvements to the immovable burdened by the mortgage.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 1829 provides, in pertinent part, that "[s]ubrogation takes place by
operation of law ... (5) [iun the other cases provided by law."
68. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Continental Marble & Granite Co., 615 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1993).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1111.
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insofar as third persons are concerned.7 Thus, at the time the dation en
paiement was completed (between Hibernia and Continental Marble), there was
no error since Continental Marble's judgment creditor had not filed its judgment
for recordation.
The court also rejected Hibernia's claim that its forty-eight hour delay in
filing the dation en paiement for recordation--characterized by Hibernia as a
"reasonable" time based upon usual practice in the area-should immunize it
from the pure "race" aspect of Louisiana's system of registry. The court noted
that, "in this state registry is not a mere matter of notice alone, but a matter of
public policy upon a 'most important property right;' and that considerations of
equity cannot prevail against it.72
E. Mandataries and Free Agents on their Own
In Teachers' Retirement System v. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement
System,73 the supreme court reversed a decision by the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal upholding the trial court's grant of an exception of no right of
action against an undisclosed principal seeking to enforce a contract. The first
circuit concluded that an agent acting for an undisclosed principal in negotiating
a contract was in reality a pr&e-nom, acting on its own behalf rather than for the
alleged principal. 74 Thus, only the agent, and not the undisclosed principal, had
a claim against the other contracting party. The supreme court premised its
reversal upon a lack of evidence in the record that prevented it from determining
whether "the plaintiffs, dismissed by the lower courts on the no right of action
71. A giving in payment has no effect without "delivery" of the thing to the obligee. Durnford
v. Syndics of Brooks, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 222 (1814); Wilson v. Smith, 12 La. 375 (1838). Prior to that,
the agreement is merely executory; there is no transfer of ownership, and the debt is not extinguished
or reduced. See La. Civ. Code art. 2656; Donoven & Daley v. Travelers & Hermann, 122 La. 458,
47 So. 769 (1908). The delivery of the thing to the creditor extinguishing or reducing the debt and
perfecting the dation distinguishes a giving in payment from a novation. Compare La. Civ. Code
art. 2655 ("The giving in payment is an act by which a debtor gives a thing to the creditor, who is
willing to receive it, in payment of a sum that is due.") with La. Civ. Code art. 1881 and La. Civ.
Code art. 1879 ("Novation is the extinguishment of an existing obligation by the substitution of a
new one."). The delivery of an immovable is complete upon the delivery of the act that evidences
the sale. La. Civ. Code art. 2479; Miller v. Miller, 234 La. 883, 893, 102 So. 2d 52, 55 (1957);
Shultz v. Morgan, 27 La. Ann. 616 (1875). The act is a deed containing the elements of a perfected
sale, to wit: A description of the thing sold, the price, and the consent to transfer ownership by the
effect of the deed. See Gibson v. Zylks, 186 La. 1043, 1047, 173 So. 757, 758-59 (1937). The deed
may be either an authentic act or an act under private signature. La. Civ. Code art. 1839.
72. Hibernia, 615 So. 2d at 1111 (quoting State ex rel. Hebert v. Recorder of Mortgages, 175
La. 94, 100, 143 So. 15, 17 (1932)). See La. Civ. Code arts. 1839, 2021; La. Civ. Code art. 2035;
La. R.S. 9:2756 (1991).
73. 456 So. 2d 594 (La. 1984).
74. Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement Sys., 444 So. 2d 193,
196-97 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 456 So. 2d 594 (1984).
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exception, have no legal interest in the subject matter, or in judicially enforcing
the right asserted in the litigation."75
Nine years after rendering its decision in Teachers' Retirement System, the
first circuit revisited the question of whether an undisclosed principal has a right
of action against the party that came to terms with the ostensible agent for breach
of the contract. In Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership v. Doster Construction
Co.,76 a limited partnership brought suit for breach of contract, seeking to
enforce its alleged rights stemming from an agreement struck between two other
companies. The plaintiff argued that the contract was negotiated in its favor, as
an undisclosed principal, by one of the contracting parties.77 In affirming the
trial court's granting of an exception of no right of action, the first circuit
recognized its rejection of other appellate authority78 and reiterated its position,
stated in Teachers' Retirement System, that there is no right of action in contract
benefiting an "undisclosed principal" to an agreement.79
The court's conclusion concerning an "undisclosed principal" is valid.
Simply, the undisclosed principal is not a party to the agreement and the Civil
Code provides an action in contract to third persons only in the instance of a
stipulation pour autrui.80
F. Nothing More, Nothing Less-The Buyer Getting What He Thought He
Bought
Scogin v. Smith8 presented the first circuit with the issue whether the
existence of delinquent taxes on property conveyed to another constitutes a
breach of the seller's obligations concerning warranties against eviction and
redhibitory vices. 2 Relying upon Williams v. Louisiana Machinery Co.," for
the proposition that redhibition is available only in the context of "physical
imperfections or deformity," the first circuit upheld the trial court's judgment that
delinquent taxes did not constitute a redhibitory defect. 84 The court also held
75. Teachers', 456 So. 2d at 598.
76. 602 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), judgment set aside, 623 So. 2d 645 (1993).
77. Id. at 1030.
78. Childers v. Police Jury, 9 La. App. 490, 121 So. 248 (2d Cir. 1928); DeSoto Bldg. Co. v.
Kohnstamm, 3 Pelt. 54 (La. App. 1919).
79. Woodlawn Park, 602 So. 2d at 1031. Nothing in the court's opinion addressed whether
the contract in question lacked the necessary prerequisites for a valid stipulation pour autrui
benefitting the "undisclosed principal." The court addressed this issue in Teachers' and concluded
that a stipulation pour autrui was not present because the language of the agreement did not include
an express declaration of intent to benefit the alleged third-party beneficiary. Teachers', 444 So. 2d
at 195.
80. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1978-1982.
81. 612 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
82. La. Civ. Code art. 1949; La. Civ. Code arts. 2500-2548; La. Civ. Code arts. 2439, 2452,
2475, 2557-2565.
83. 387 So. 2d 8 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
84. Scogin, 612 So. 2d at 741 (citing Williams, 387 So. 2d at 11).
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that rescission of a sale for eviction, pursuant to Article 2506, is not available
when the state has acquired the property for nonpayment of taxes.85 The
adjudication is only a partial eviction and is insufficient to justify judicial
rescission of the sale.16 The first circuit adopted the trial court's view that the
buyer could, in these circumstances, redeem the property from the state by
paying the delinquent taxes and proceed against the vendor for the amount of the
taxes. 7 The court's conclusion denying rescission may be incorrect.
Redhibition is defined in Article 2520 as "the avoidance of a sale on account
of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely
useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that
the buyer would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice."8 8 Although
most of the jurisprudence treating redhibition speaks in terms of physical defects
or vices,89 Article 2529 expressly authorizes an action in redhibition based
upon a misrepresentation "that the thing sold has some quality which it is found
not to have," thereby extending the scope of the action to situations involving no
physical vice or defect.'
In essence, the redhibitory claim is premised upon a failure of cause.9
Article 1949, authorizing the courts to avoid contracts for unilateral error, is
analogous. 92 The jurisprudence also establishes that redhibition and error are
alternative solutions to the problem.93 Either may empower a court to rescind
a contract upon a showing of what amounts to the failure of the principal cause
of the contract.
The court in Scogin may have acted too abruptly in dismissing the plaintiff's
claim for rescission. An established principle of the law of Louisiana is that a
85. Id. at 741.
86. Id. at 742
87. Id.
88. La. Civ. Code art. 2520.
89. See, e.g., Harper v. Coleman Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1366 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1987); Williams, 387 So. 2d at 11.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2529. See Couch v. Frichter's Sportsmen's Haven, Inc., 365 So. 2d 901,
903 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 367 So. 2d 1185 (1979) ("An action for redhibition or
reduction lies notwithstanding the good faith of the seller where the thing sold lacks a quality which
it was represented to have, if this quality was a principal motive for making the contract."). See also
Fusilier v. Ardoin, 266 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Kardis v. Barrere, 17 La. App. 433, 438,
136 So. 135, 138-39 (Orl. Cir. 1931) ("quality," as used in Article 2529, refers to misrepresentations
as to character, make, nature, characteristics, manufacture, or trade-mark).
91. See La. Civ. Code art. 2520. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2529 with La. Civ. Code art.
1949.
92. La. Civ. Code art. 1949 ("Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without
which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been
known to the other party."). See, e.g., Nugent v. Stanley, 336 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976).
93. See, e.g., Kardis, 17 La. App. 433, 136 So. 135 (relying upon both error and redhibition).
See also Wax v. Woods, 209 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 252 La. 467, 211 So. 2d
330 (1968).
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partial eviction can support rescission of the contract if the buyer would not have
made the purchase without the lost rights.94 As stated above, proof of a failure
of cause supports a claim for rescission.95 Because the court did not analyze
this element of the contract, there was not a complete resolution of the issues.
G. Freedom of Contract and Imperative Legislation
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628, the "Entire Contract Policy Statute," is
a legislative pronouncement of the formal requirements for modifications to the
coverage of insurance policies.' In particular, this section provides the
following:
No agreement in conflict with, modifying, or extending the coverage of
any contract of insurance shall be valid unless it is in writing and
physically made a part of the policy or other written evidence of insur-
ance, or it is incorporated in the policy or other written evidence of
insurance ....
The provisions of this Section shall apply where a policy or other
written evidence of insurance is coupled by specific reference: with
another policy or written evidence of insurance in existence as of the
effective date hereof or issued thereafter.
Any written agreement in conflict with, modifying, or extending the
coverage of any contract of insurance shall be deemed to be physically
made a part of a policy or other written evidence of insurance, within
the meaning of this section, whenever such written agreement makes
reference to such policy or evidence of insurance and is sent to the
holder of such policy or evidence of insurance by United States mail,
postage prepaid, at such holder's last known address as shown on such
policy or evidence of insurance or is personally delivered to such
holder.97
In Lindsey v. Colonial Lloyd's Insurance Co.,g8 the supreme court determined
that Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628 did not invalidate a "two tier" insurance
policy that extends the insurance coverage of the lessor to its lessee but reduces
the coverage the lessor had under the original policy with the insurer flowing
94. La. Civ. Code arts. 2506, 2511, and 2514; Huckabay v. Keaton, 600 So. 2d 97, 100 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1992) ("[E]ven where the buyer is only partially evicted, he may still have the sale
cancelled if he would not have made the purchase without the part from which he has been evicted.")
(citing Richmond v. Zapata Dev., 350 So. 2d 875 (La. 1977); Collins v. Slocum, 317 So. 2d 672 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 321 So. 2d 364 (1975)).
95. See Huckabay, 600 So. 2d at 97; Collins, 317 So. 2d at 672.
96. La. R.S. 22:628 (Supp. 1993).
97. Id.
98. 595 So. 2d 606 (La. 1992).
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from a rental agreement. 99 The Lindsey case involved an automobile accident
in which a leased car hit and injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit
against the driver of the rental car and her insurer, her own uninsured motorist
carrier, and the automobile lessor's insurer.
The trial court, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff, concluded that
a provision in the automobile rental agreement that purported to limit the
$500,000 coverage potentially available to the lessee of the automobile to the
statutory minimum had no effect because the insurer had not complied with
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628 in reducing coverage. The intermediate court
of appeal reversed, holding that the original insurance policy was modified by
the rental agreement)°°
The supreme court, in affirming the ruling of the fourth circuit, concluded
that the "two tier" insurance arrangement in the automobile lease contract,
resulting in reduced liability protection to the lessee from the full amount of
coverage available to the lessor under its policy with its insurer, was valid.10'
The court stated that the constraints upon the allocation of risks concerning an
insured and a third person "are those that apply to all contracts,"' 2 and that no
legislation or public policy dictated that the automobile lessee receive the same
protection purchased by the lessor. 3
In examining the applicability of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628, the
supreme court concluded that it protects "the parties to the insurance contract by
assuring that both had in their possession the entire contract," and, consequently,
"that § 628 does not provide and was not meant to provide protection to third
parties.' '  The court also addressed what restrictions apply to two-tier
insurance policies and decided that public policy guides are the only limits to
agreements between a policyholder and a third party regarding allocating risks
between them via the insurance policy.'0 5 The court saw no prohibition in the
Insurance Code or elsewhere against "two tier" insurance agreements and stated
that the provision in the lease, for the statutory minimum coverage, did not
offend public policy or any legislation.'
6
99. Id. at 614. In his concurring opinion, Justice Hall took issue with the majority's conclusion
that the requirements of the statute had been met in the instant case because of the inconsistent
finding that "the 'entire contract policy statute' is designed for the protection of the named insured
only." Id. at 614-15 (Hall, J., concurring). Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Watson considered La.
R.S. 22:628 to be implicated by the rental agreement's limitation of the total coverage to be provided
by the insurer, invalidating any purported limitations on the amount of coverage offered by the
insurer in its policy with the lessor. Id. at 615 (Watson, J., dissenting).
100. 581 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 595 So. 2d 606 (1992).
101. Lindsey, 595 So. 2d at 614.
102. Id. at 612.
103. Id. at 612-14.
104. Id. at 611 (citing Guarantee Bank & Trust Co. v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 526 So. 2d 1094,
1098 (La. 1988); Johnson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (La. 1979)).
105. Id. at 612-14.
106. Id. at 614. The court relied, in part, upon "a survey of cases around the country" in
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The court's decision is consistent with the theory of autonomie de la
volont t.10 7 The parties to a contract should be free to agree so long as they do not
contradict public policy,'08 which in this case extended no further than requiring
the lessor to furnish the minimum statutory coverage to its customers.'19
arriving at its conclusion. Id. at 612-13 (citing Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 465
N.E. 2d 403 (Ohio 1984)).
107. See La. Civ. Code art. 1983. See also C. Civ. art. 1134 ("Agreements legally formed have
the character of loi for those who have made them."); La. Civ. Code arts. 1968, 2033.
108. See generally Alejandro M. Garro, Codification Technique and the Problem of Imperative
and Suppletive Laws, 41 La. L. Rev. 1007 (1981).
109. In a footnote, the court suggested that the law is ambiguous regarding a lessor's
requirement to provide any insurance to lessees protecting against a lessee's own negligence.
Lindsey, 595 So. 2d at 613 n.12 (citing La. R.S. 32:900; La. R.S. 32:1041(B)). The court did not
explore this subject, however, since the litigants did not raise it.
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